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CHILDREN'S UNDERSTANDING OF MENTIONS, EMOTIONS AND INTENTION-EMOTION RELATIONSHIPS 
Children's Understanding of 
Intentions, Emotions, and 
Intention-Emotion Relationships 
Kathleen Grace Haver 
and Elaine M. Justice 
Old Dominion University 
ABSTRACT 
This study examined children's 
understanding of the role of intentionality 
in social interactions. Four, six, and eight 
year olds were read stories, illustrated with 
simple pictures, depicting accidental or 
deliberate actions. The study used a forced 
choice paradigm that asked children to 
indicate which of two pictures showed (1) 
an intentional (or unintentional) act and (2) 
a situation in which the victim would be 
sad (or mad). Six and eight year olds, but 
not Four year olds, correctly identified 
deliberate actions at above chance levels. 
Eight year olds identified accidental actions 
and situations in which the victim would be 
mad at above chance. Understanding that 
anger was an expected emotional response 
to intentional harm, but not to accidental 
harm, increased with age. 
INTRODUCTION 
This study investigated children's 
understanding of intentions, emotions, and 
the relation of other people's intentions to 
people's emotional responses. 
Understanding of intention is an aspect of a 
child's "theory of mind", which is the 
understanding a child has of his or her own 
and other's minds and the relation between 
the mind and the world (Astington, 1991). 
This understanding allows children to 
predict and explain actions by referring to 
their own and others' mental states. These 
mental states include beliefs, desires, and 
intentions (Astington, 1991). 
Astington (1991) stated that the 
child's "theory of mind" develops 
gradually from infancy through school age; 
however, the greatest change occurs at age 
four. Recent studies indicate that, in 
contrast to younger children, Four year 
olds demonstrate increased understanding 
of a variety of mental states, including  
belief, desire, and intentions (Astington & 
Gopnik, 1991; Perner, 1988; Perner, 
Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987). Although by 
the age of four there has been enormous 
development in a child's "theory of mind", 
additional understanding emerges during 
the school years, including awareness of 
the social implications of cognitive states 
(Astington & Gopnik, 1991). 
An important aspect of "theory of 
mind" involves the concept of intention as 
a mental state which leads to an intended 
action. Several studies suggest that 
preschool children have some 
understanding of intentionality. Shultz, 
Wells, and Sarda (1980) examined 
intentionality by having three- to seven-
year-olds look at various situations dealing 
with pennies. In some cases the child was 
misled and chose the incorrect penny. The 
results showed that children as young as 
three could tell the difference between their 
intended choice and the unintended choice 
in which they chose the wrong penny due 
to the misleading information. Astington 
and Lee (1988) showed that four or five-
years-olds, but not three-year-olds, could 
correctly identify appropriate relationships 
between desire and intentions and the 
correct emotion for the stated outcome in 
the story. 
Intentions in social situations add 
another dimension in which a child must 
understand not only his/her own views but 
also another person's actions and the 
consequences experienced by others. The 
understanding of these social situations 
may be more difficult to understand and 
therefore develop at a later point than does 
the understanding of individual intentions. 
Justice, Clarke, Haver, and Cassidy 
(1993) looked at three-, Four, and five-
year-olds. Each child heard eight stories 
featuring two children which showed one 
child doing something either "by accident" 
or "on purpose". This action resulted in the 
other child experiencing a negative 
consequence. Each child was read a story 
and asked to point to the face that showed 
the emotion of the victim (sad/mad). The 
child was also asked about the 
intentionality of the perpetrator in the story. 
The results of the study showed that across 
ages children more often correctly 
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identified accidental actions to be 
unintentional than deliberate actions as 
intentional. Findings also suggested that, 
even at the age of five, children have not 
developed the understanding of intentions 
in social situations, or if they have, they 
are reluctant to indicate that the harmful 
action was deliberate. 
Several studies suggest that 
preschool children have the understanding 
that there is a relationship between a 
situation and an emotional response. 
Michalson and Lewis (1985) showed that 
emotions such as happy, sad, and mad are 
simple emotions that are understood to 
correspond with situations and can, in 
turn, be identified through facial 
expressions. Furthermore, Michalson and 
Lewis (1985) have argued that assessment 
of children's understanding of emotion 
must take into consideration their lexical 
knowledge. It has been found that children 
can identify different emotions at an earlier 
point than they can label them. 
Recent studies have examined 
children's understanding of the relation of 
other's intentions to an emotional response 
to those actions. Barden, Zelko, Duncan, 
and Masters (1980) examined whether 
kindergarten, third, and sixth graders could 
appropriately match an emotional response 
to a given scenario. The finding was that 
were no age differences for being the target 
of aggression. Almost all of the children 
indicated that they would be angry first and 
sad second. 
Michalson and Lewis (1985) 
looked at a particular situation and the 
facial expression that would likely occur 
because of that situation. Children between 
two and five years of age, plus a small 
group of adults, were given a scenario and 
asked to choose the face that the character 
would express. In the sad scenario, few 
age differences were found between the 
three-, Four, and five-year-olds in 
choosing the sad face. For the anger 
situation, up to 40% of all children, 
regardless of age, chose the sad face. In 
this task, by age five, children could 
identify the emotional characteristics of 
certain situations in ways very similar to 
adults. 
Previous studies examined the 
understanding of emotions in situations 
where a particular emotion would be 
expected. In some situations, however, the 
characteristic emotion would depend on 
one's interpretation of the situation. Justice 
et. al. (1993) examined preschoolers' 
interpretations of the accidental and 
deliberate actions of others, and the 
emotional response of the victim to those 
actions. The children in the study were 
three-, Four, and five-year-olds. The 
results showed children were more likely 
to indicate that the victim would be sad 
rather than mad in both accidental and 
deliberate situations. It was hypothesized 
that these findings may have resulted from 
children being reluctant to indicate that the 
action was deliberate and, in particular, to 
indicate that the victim would respond with 
anger. The findings of Justice et. al.(1993) 
suggest that the understanding of intention-
emotion relationships develops over an 
extended age range and is more complex 
than originally thought. 
Several changes in Justice et. al. 
(1993) were made to address 
methodological problems in the study. The 
first change included the way in which the 
story was presented. In the current study, a 
forced choice format was used in which 
intentional and unintentional acts were 
portrayed. Control questions were used to 
ensure that the child understood the 
difference between the two scenarios 
presented. Finally, a broader range of ages 
was used in order to elicit a clearer 
developmental pattern. 
It was hypothesized that the 
understanding of intention and the expected 
emotional responses would increase with 
age. Furthermore, it was hypothesized that 
the older the child, the more certain he/she 
would be of his/her choice. Lastly, it was 
hypothesized that understanding of the 
relation between perceived intention and 
emotional response would increase with 
age. 
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METHOD 
Subjects 
The participants in this study were 
64 Four, six, and eight year-old children, 
with approximately equal numbers of male 
and female children at each age. Children 
participated with parental permission. 
Materials 
The materials used were eight 
stories, illustrated with simple drawings, 
depicting two, same-sex, children in a 
social interaction. Each interaction involved 
some behavior on the part of one child that 
resulted in a negative consequence for the 
other child. Four stories involved property 
loss which included: losing a balloon; an 
ice cream cone falling on the floor, a doll 
falling onto the floor, and a house made of 
blocks being knocked down. Four stories 
involved physical harm: fingers getting 
pinched in a window; a ball hitting an arm; 
a child falling off a merry-go-round; and a 
child being tripped. 
In each story the first picture 
established the base line. In the next two 
pictures the intentionality was established 
through the use of word bubbles. In one 
picture the perpetrator stated the intention 
to harm, while in the other there was a 
stated intention not indicating intentional 
harm. The last picture showed the outcome 
of the actions, which was the same for 
both intentions. 
Pretest materials included a page 
with a picture of both a mad and a sad face. 
Also, there were four pictures illustrating a 
story in which one child experienced a 
negative consequence for his own 
intentional and unintentional actions. The 
child in the story was playing with a sand 
castle and did something deliberately in one 
picture and accidentally in another. In one 
picture the child kicks down the sand 
castle, and in the other, the child trips and 
falls on the sand castle. In the final picture, 
the sand castle has collapsed. 
Also used in the study was a 
certainty judgment scale. This scale 
consisted of five bar graphs which 
increased in height from left to right. The 
smallest bar represented the least amount of  
certainty, and the largest bar represented 
the most amount of certainty. 
Procedure 
Children were brought into a quiet 
room at their school and seated next to the 
experimenter. They were told that they 
would hear some stories and would be 
asked questions about the children in the 
stories. The pretest was given to test 
whether the child could identify the 
emotions of sad (S) or mad (M). This was 
done by asking the child to point to a sad 
and a mad face. If the child could not 
identify the emotions, each face was 
explained until the child understood. 
Children were also pretested for 
their understanding of the difference 
between on purpose (OP) and by accident 
(BA). The sand castle story, in which a 
child experienced a negative consequence 
to his own actions, was presented to the 
child. Three control questions were asked 
to establish if the child could identify the 
actions in each picture. The first question 
asked what happened in the story . The 
next two questions asked the child to point 
to the picture that matched the appropriate 
word bubble. If the child was incorrect, the 
story was read again until the child could 
answer the control questions. Then the 
child was asked to point to the OP picture 
and then point to the BA picture. Also in 
the pretest, the child was asked to make 
certainty judgments about his/her selections 
about intentionality. Each child was shown 
a bar graph and was asked to point to the 
bar which showed how much the child 
believed the intention to be OP or BA, 
depending upon the question type. 
Following the pretest, the eight 
stories were read. After each story, three 
control questions were asked. The child 
was then asked one intention question (OP 
or BA), and one emotion question (M or S) 
for each story. There were four possible 
combinations of intention/emotion 
questions. These combinations included: 
OP question asked with a M question; an 
OP question asked with a S emotional 
question; a BA question asked with a M 
question; and, finally, a BA question posed 
with a S question. Each child received two 
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of each intention/emotion combinations. 
The way in which the questions were 
asked within each order was random, with 
the exception that no two like combinations 
were asked in a row. Also, each child was 
shown each story only once. 
RESULTS 
The dependent variables in this 
study were the percent correct for each 
child on each type of intention question 
(OP or BA) and the percent correct on each 
type of emotion question (S or M). 
Certainty judgments for each question type 
were also measured. 
Understanding of Intentions 
An age (3) x sex (2) x intention 
question type (2, OP/BA) analysis of 
variance was conducted on the percent 
correct on OP and BA questions with 
repeated measures on the last factor. There 
was a significant age effect, E(2,58) = 
20.59, 2 < .01, and a significant type 
effect, E(1,58) = 10.46, 2< .01. Correct 
identification of accidental and deliberate 
actions increased with age. Mean percent 
correct for deliberate actions was .53, .81, 
.90, for four, six, and eight year-olds, 
respectively. Mean percent correct for 
accidental actions was .48, .60, and .77 
for four, six, and eight year olds, 
respectively. The number correct for OP 
actions was greater than that for BA 
actions. Mean percent correct was .75 and 
.62 for OP and BA, respectively. As 
shown in Figure 1, this tendency increased 
with age. However the grade x type 



















Figure 1. Percent correct identification of OP and BA 
actions across age. 
An age (3) x sex (2) x intention 
question type (2) analysis of the certainty 
judgments on OP and BA trials showed a 
significant type effect, E(1,58) = 9.02, 12< 
0.01. The children were more certain of 
their judgment on the OP than the BA 
trials. Mean certainty judgments were 4.42 
and 3.98 for OP and BA, respectively. 
Additional analysis addressed the 
question of whether the percent correct 
judgments for each age and question type 
differed significantly from chance. For the 
OP question type, both the six and eight 
year olds, but not four year olds, differed 
significantly from chance, 1(21) = 2.23 and 
2.86, 2 < .05, for six and eight year olds, 
respectively. For the BA question type, 
only the eight year olds differed 
significantly from chance, 1(23) = 2.09, 
12<.05. 
Understanding of Emotions 
An age (3) x sex (2) x emotion 
question type (2) analysis of variance was 
conducted on the percent correct on 
sad/mad questions, with a repeated 
measure on the last factor. Results showed 
main effects for age, F(2,58) = 3.35, 2< 
.05, sex, F(1,58) = 6.72, 2 < .01, and 
question type, F(1,58) = 30.54, 2 <.01, 
and an age x question type interaction, 
E(2,58) = 6.08, 12. < .01. Males scored 
higher than females on both mad and sad 
questions. Mean scores for males were .72 
for mad and .45 for sad, and for females 
.62 for mad .34 for sad. The age x 
question type interaction resulted from the 
finding that scores on mad increased with 
age, whereas the scores for sad did not. 
This is illustrated in Figure 2. 
A binomial test for significant 
differences from chance found that only the 
eight year olds were significantly different 
from chance on the mad questions, /(23) = 
2.46, 2 < .05. None of the age graphs 
differed from chance on the sad question. 
An age (3) x sex (2) x emotion 
question type (2, M/S) analysis of variance 
of the certainty judgments on emotion 
questions showed no significant effects. 
Certainty on the emotion questions did not 
differ across age or question type. 
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Figure 2. Percent correct identification of S and M 
responses across age. 
Understanding of the Intention-
Emotion Relationship 
To address children's awareness of 
the relation of perceived intention to 
emotional response, children's ability to 
correctly answer both intention and 
emotion questions for each intention 
question/emotion question combination 
was examined. This analysis addressed 
children's ability to correctly choose the 
same picture on BA/S and OP/M trials, and 
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Figure 3. Percent of each intention-emotion trial type 
on which children were correct on both intention and 
emotion questions. 
An age (3) x sex (2) x trial type (4, 
BA/S, BA/M, OP/S, OP/M) analysis of 
variance with repeated measures on the last 
factor was conducted on the percent of 
trials on which the child was correct on 
both intention and emotion questions. 
There was a significant age effect, F(2,58) 
= 11.17, a < 0.01, and trial type effect, 
f(3,56) - 30.57,12 < .01, and a significant 
age x trial interaction, F(6,112) = 3.17, 
.01. As illustrated in Figure 3, 
performance on both the OP and BA trials, 
which included the M component, 
increased with age, whereas the OP and  
BA trials, which included the S, 
component did not. 
DISCUSSION 
Results of this study indicate that 
understanding intention in a social situation 
may develop significantly later than 
understanding of individual intentionality. 
In contrast to previous research 
demonstrating preschool understanding of 
the intentional or unintentional nature of 
behavior, (Astington, 1991), only six and 
eight year olds correctly identified 
deliberate behavior as intentional at above 
chance levels. These data suggest that the 
development of children's "theory of 
mind" continues well into the grade school 
years. Building on initial understanding of 
the relation of intentions, beliefs, and 
desires to an individual's behavior, 
advances in perspective-taking skills 
during the early school years may 
contribute to an understanding of the role 
of others' mental states in their behavior. 
The current findings also indicate 
that understanding that emotional response 
is related to the perceived intentions of 
others may follow understanding of 
intentionality. Although six and eight year 
olds correctly identified intentional 
behavior at above chance levels, only eight 
year olds were above chance in 
identification of anger as the expected 
emotional response to deliberate harm. 
Although preschool children can identify 
simple emotions (Michalson & Lewis, 
1985), the ability to infer the expected 
emotional response of another in a social 
situation appears to develop much later. 
Consistent with this is the current finding 
that understanding that anger is an expected 
emotional response to deliberate, but not 
accidental harm, showed significant 
developmental increases between four and 
eight years of age. 
An interesting finding in this study 
was that there were no developmental 
changes in identification of sadness as a 
response to accidental, but not deliberate, 
harm. This finding may reflect the fact that 
sadness may be an appropriate response to 
both deliberate and accidental actions. 
Also, findings by Justice, et al. (1993) 
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suggest that preschool children are 
reluctant to indicate that they or others 
would respond with anger, even in a 
deliberate harm situation. 
A number of additional questions 
are posed by these findings. In the current 
study, the intentional or unintentional 
nature of the behavior was explicitly stated 
by the perpetrator. In most everyday 
interactions, intentions are implicit and, 
therefore, more difficult to identify. 
Research on developmental changes in 
identification of explicitly or implicitly 
intentional behavior are needed. Also, 
studies examining understanding of the 
mental states of others should be 
broadened to include information on 
children's understanding of the relation of 
emotion to interpersonal cognitions. 
Additional studies on emotions including 
sadness, happiness, and fear in response to 
the perceived intentions or beliefs of others 
are needed. Such data would contribute 
importantly to understanding the role of 
children's "theory of mind" in social 
interactions. 
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